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Hullinger: Are Judges Policymakers?

ARE JUDGES POLICYMAKERS?: A CONSTITUTIONAL REBUFF
TO JUDICIAL REFORM
Zach Hullinger

I. INTRODUCTION

It is a bedrock principle of our democracy that the ultimate power
rests with the people. This is not merely an ideal, it is constitutional
practice. The Founders guaranteed this preservation of power through
their careful structure of the government into three separate branches,
balanced to ensure that this promise rang true. The judicial branch is
the least answerable to the people, a desirable trait for a body that is
supposed to adhere to fixed rules, and which has an ostensibly limited
scope in deciding only those cases and controversies which are brought
before it.1 But as this branch has “updated” the Constitution to reflect
its own view of modern society and the people’s will,2 and as Congress
has receded behind administrative delegation3 and deferred to the other
branches on controversial political topics by virtue of partisan
impasse4 and ineptitude,5 the Supreme Court has shaken free from
some of these carefully constructed constraints. Now that the people
have come to understand the true nature of the modern Court’s role, it
should come as no surprise that at least some of them wish to exert
influence over the judiciary, to ensure that the ultimate power does in
fact rest with the people, and not robed crusaders.
While the legislative process is an obvious obstacle to judicial
reform, the real roadblock is constitutional. Reform that seeks to
prevent political control of the courts necessarily involves an inquiry
into the political affiliation of the judges. Former 2020 Democratic
presidential nominee Pete Buttigieg had proposed expanding the
Supreme Court to 15 seats: five Republicans, five Democrats, and five
justices appointed by the unanimous consent of the ten politically
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2603 (2015) (holding that the framers
“entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning,” and that this meaning should include “new insights and societal understandings”).
3. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(questioning the scope of current Congressional delegation as a violation of the separation of powers).
4. The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RES. CENTER (OCT. 5, 2017),
https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/
[https://perma.cc/FK7H-KWX3] (showing an increase in political polarization on a variety of issues).
5. House
Workload,
80th-115th
Congresses,
1947-2018,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/6-1-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CEE-GD4R]
(showing an overall trend of decline in legislation passed, and a decline in committee and subcommittee
meetings).
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affiliated justices.6 While this approach seeks to depoliticize the
Court, it actually institutionalizes politics by conditioning the
nomination of justices on their political affiliation.
The Supreme Court has held that conditioning employment on
political patronage is generally a First Amendment violation, but has
carved out an exception for “policymaking” positions.7
Do judges fall within this exception? Can their appointments be
conditioned on a particular political affiliation? The Third Circuit
confronted this question in Adams v. Governor of Delaware, where it
invalidated a 122-year-old framework of the Delaware Constitution
while creating a circuit split on the issue.8 Section II of this Casenote
reviews the trio of Supreme Court decisions that have outlined the
policymaking exception. Section III examines the current circuit split
on whether judges fall within the policymaking exception, contrasting
Adams v. Governor of Delaware with two previous circuit decisions:
Kurowski v. Krajewski and Newman v. Voinovich.9 Section IV
analyzes the circuit courts’ approaches in applying the policymaking
exception to judges, concluding that a proper understanding of the
exception does not permit partisan conditions for judicial
appointments. Section V assesses the impact of this exception on
judicial reform efforts, and discusses the impact this could have on
judicial reform and the judicial appointment process. Section VI offers
some brief concluding thoughts on the policymaking exception.
II. BACKGROUND

Recognizing the First Amendment right to freedom of association,
the Supreme Court has held political patronage firings to be “at war
with” the First Amendment.10 As a general matter, firings made on the
basis of an employee’s political affiliation are unconstitutional.11 And
it would seem entirely natural that firing a typical office worker for
nothing more than his or her political affiliation infringes on those
well-established protections afforded by the First Amendment. But
can the president effectively fulfill his duties, and implement the
policies that the people sought when electing him, if he cannot appoint
6. Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS
(June 3, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan-overhaulsupreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/FUB5-K5U4].
7. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
8. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2019).
9. Id.; Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1988); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d
159 (6th Cir. 1993).
10. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357.
11. Id.
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a Secretary of State who shares his policy views?12 Recognizing this
justification for political patronage, the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to the general prohibition by permitting patronage practices
for “policymaking” positions.13 This exception was outlined by a trio
of Supreme Court decisions spanning from 1976 to 1990: Elrod v.
Burns, Branti v. Finkel, and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.14
The first case, Elrod, enunciated both the general prohibition against
patronage firings, and the policymaking exception to the default rule.15
The Court recognized a valid justification for certain patronage firings,
which it framed as “the need for political loyalty of employees . . . to
the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics
obstructing the implementation of policies of the new
administration.”16 The Court held that this governmental interest
could be satisfied by limiting these firings to “policymaking”
positions.17 While the Court’s struggle to define what constituted a
“policymaking” position was certainly ominous, the Court emphasized
several considerations, such as the responsibilities and scope of the
position, and whether the employee “acts as an adviser or formulates
plans for the implementation of broad goals.”18 Elrod mustered a mere
three-member plurality in a thoroughly fractured opinion. While its
successor, Branti, was no less divided in its 5-4 holding, the Court did
manage a majority in its second application of the exception.19
Branti held that assistant public defenders were not policymakers
and could not be fired by the newly appointed Democrat on the basis
of their political beliefs, but offered a slightly different articulation of
the policymaking exception.20 The Court held that the ultimate inquiry
was not whether the “policymaker” label fit the position, but “whether
the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved.”21 The Court explained that political affiliation is not
an appropriate requirement for all positions that involve making
12. Elrod rejected application of the political question doctrine since the case merely involved a
state government, and not any relationship between the federal government and the judiciary. Id. at 35152. Whether federal appointments would present a political question under this exception remains an
open question.
13. Id. at 367.
14. Id. at 347; Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
62 (1990).
15. Elrod , 427 U.S. at 367.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 367-68.
19. Branti, 445 U.S. 507.
20. Id. at 519.
21. Id. at 518.
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policy, because even though football coaches, for example, may
formulate policy, their political affiliation is not relevant.22
Branti serves as the current test that lower courts apply to determine
whether political patronage violates an employee’s First Amendment
rights. The final case in the trio, Rutan, did not offer any additional
gloss on what constitutes a policymaking position, but extended Branti
and Elrod, which concerned only patronage firings, to include
“promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions based on party
affiliation and support.”23 While Rutan extended the reach of Branti
and Elrod to include hiring decisions, it did not elaborate on or displace
the existing framework for determining whether a position can
properly be conditioned on partisan affiliation. The Court did state in
a footnote that Branti’s formulation “refined the exception created by
Elrod.”24
These three cases comprise the entirety of the Supreme Court’s
direction on the policymaking exception. All the lower courts have to
do is apply an exception that, in the Court’s own words, has no clear
line.25 When courts struggle to find that line, judicial appointments
present one of those cases that could fall on either side. Judges are not
Secretaries of State, nor are they mere office secretaries. So can the
chamber doors be affixed with a partisan padlock? Until 2019, the
answer had been a unanimous yes.
III. DOES THE POLICYMAKING EXCEPTION APPLY TO JUDGES?

This section discusses Gregory v. Ashcroft26 to assess whether the
Supreme Court has ever decided that judges are policymakers, and
then progresses chronologically through the federal circuit cases that
have ruled on this issue.
A. Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991)

Although the Supreme Court has never applied the policymaking
exception to judges, the Court in Ashcroft confronted the issue of
whether judges are appointees “on the policymaking level” within the
meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).27
22. Id.
23. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990).
24. Id. at 71 n.5.
25. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976) (“No clear line can be drawn between policymaking
and nonpolicymaking positions”).
26. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991).
27. Id. at 453.
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The Court offered a highly qualified holding on this issue, since the
ADEA excludes all employees unless it is “unmistakably clear” that
they should be included.28 The Court noted that the language of “on
the policymaking level” does not necessarily inquire as to whether
judges make policy, but only requires that they exercise “discretion
concerning issues of public importance.”29 In holding that “[i]t is at
least ambiguous whether a state judge is an ‘appointee on the
policymaking level,’” the Court avoided fully resolving the issue, and
expressly declined to decide whether judges make policy or are
“policymakers in the same sense as the executive or the legislature.”30
Even if the Court had held that judges were policymakers, this would
not have resolved the question under the Elrod-Branti exception, for
reasons that will be more fully discussed in Part IV.
B. Kurowski v. Krajewski (1988)

The Seventh Circuit was the first of three federal circuits to decide
whether judges are policymakers within the meaning of the ElrodBranti exception, though Kurowski did not squarely present the issue.
Rather, the case concerned a judge who fired public defenders for their
political affiliation.31 In attempting to distinguish these public
defenders from those in Branti, Judge Krajewski argued that since he
had a practice of appointing public defenders to serve as judges pro
tempore in his absence, this position fell within the policymaking
exception.32 The court ultimately held that judges pro tempore are
policymakers, and that the “first amendment is no obstacle” to
patronage firings for the position.33
In applying the policymaking exception, the court first rejected the
notion that the inquiry turns on whether the employee implements the
appointing authority’s policies, reasoning that this construction would
prevent a governor from considering a judge’s politics when making
28. Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
29. Id. at 466-67. Justice White framed the issue clearly in his partial concurrence: “it should be
remembered that the statutory exception refers to appointees ‘on the policymaking level,’ not
‘policymaking employees.’ Thus, whether or not judges actually make policy, they certainly are on the
same level as policymaking officials in other branches of government and therefore are covered by the
exception.” Id. at 483 (White, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 467. While Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 167 (6th Cir. 1993), cited Ashcroft as
holding that judges indeed are employees at the policymaking level, the Court expressly refrained from
deciding the issue. This failure to resolve the issue drew disagreement from Justice White in his partial
concurrence. Id. at 474 (White, J., concurring).
31. Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. Under Indiana law, trial judges could appoint judges pro tempore who would serve in their
stead and exercise “the full powers of the office.” Id.
33. Id. at 770.
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appointments.34 Instead, the court framed the question as “whether
there may be genuine debate about how best to carry out the duties of
the office in question, and a corresponding need for an employee
committed to the objectives of the reigning faction.”35 The court
reasoned that since judges both make and implement governmental
policy, and wade into issues of political debate, such as whether to be
suspicious of the police or to be lenient in sentencing, that their
political beliefs may be a basis for their appointment.36 The court also
noted that judges were elected in Indiana, reasoning that the Governor
may consider political affiliation, just as voters do.37 But it should be
noted that the question of the Governor’s appointments was not
properly before the court, as this case involved only the dismissal of
public defenders and their function as judges pro tempore.38
C. Newman v. Voinovich (1993)

The first proper challenge to a judicial appointment process came in
Newman, where the Sixth Circuit scrutinized former Ohio Governor
George Voinovich’s appointment practices.39 The Governor made his
interim judicial appointments after considering two candidates put
forth by Republican County Chairpersons, effectively precluding
nominees from other parties.40 While the Sixth Circuit did quote the
Branti rule as being an elaboration on the policymaking exception,41
34. Id. This decision was rendered before Rutan extended Branti and Elrod to hiring decisions.
Perhaps the court presumed the validity of partisan judicial appointments due to the longstanding practice
that Justice Scalia noted in his Rutan dissent. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 93 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
In addition to Adams v. Governor of Delaware, 922 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2019), two other recent
circuit court decisions have applied the policymaking exception in a manner that contradicts this holding.
McCaffrey v. Chapman, 921 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that a sheriff’s deputy fell within the
exception since “[r]equiring a sheriff to employ deputies who have displayed the level of hostility
portrayed in this complaint could reasonably impede a sheriff’s obligation to his electorate to implement
the platform on which he campaigned”); Eves v. LePage, 927 F.3d 575, 584 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that
the employee was a policymaker since he was “'in a position to thwart' the policy objectives of 'the inparty.'") The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has developed a nine-factor policymaker test that does not
explicitly ask whether the position can obstruct the implementation of policy. Carroll v. City of Phx., No.
CV 07-00148 PHXNVW, 2007 WL 1140400, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2007) (citing Walker v. City of
Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1132 (9th Cir.2001)).
35. Id. The court never cited the language of the “appropriate requirement” test from Branti.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Seventh Circuit later applied its Kurowski holding to an administrative hearing officer.
Walsh v. Heilmann, 472 F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 2006). The opinion was again authored by Judge
Easterbrook, 18 years after he wrote Kurowski.
39. Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 160.
41. Id. at 161.
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its analysis largely relied on Kurowski, offering several block
quotations from the opinion.42 The only original thought provided in
Newman is the court’s holding that “judges are policymakers because
their political beliefs influence and dictate their decisions on important
jurisprudential matters.”43 The three-judge panel in Newman produced
three opinions, with Judge Kennedy concurring, but refusing to join
the portion of the court’s opinion that called the Governor’s
appointment practices “unwise.”44 Judge Jones also concurred, not to
retreat from questioning the wisdom of the Governor, but to question
it more forcefully.45 His interpretation of the policymaking exception
makes his analysis far more thought-provoking than anything offered
by the opinion of the court.
Judge Jones started by recognizing the independence of the
judiciary, and its need to remain separate from “partisan theories of
government,” a view that surely animated his decision to question the
wisdom of the Governor’s procedure in his concurrence.46 He
followed this discussion with an assertion that one would expect to
find in a dissent, stating that “it cannot be seriously contended that
being a member of a certain party . . . should be a requirement for the
effective performance of being a judge.”47 This pronouncement would
seem to require the conclusion that judges do not fall within the
policymaking exception, but Judge Jones changed course. After
explaining that life experiences shape every decision a judge makes,48
he ultimately concluded that “political affiliation may be an
appropriate factor to consider,” never discussing how he substituted
“factor” for Branti’s use of the word “requirement.”49
D. Adams v. Governor of Delaware (2019)

Until 2019, every court to decide whether judges fall under the
policymaking exception had held that judges are indeed policymakers
within the meaning of Elrod and Branti.50 If any case were to split the
42. Id. at 162-63.
43. Id. at 163 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
44. Id. at 164 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 165-66 (Jones, J., concurring) (stating that he is “gravely troubled by the Ohio
Governor’s practice” and questioning the state of the law post-Rutan).
46. Id. at 164 (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller, 99 N.E. 1078,
1085 (1912)).
47. Id. at 165-66 (Jones, J., concurring) (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 91
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 165 (Jones, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Jones, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
50. See, e.g., Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1988); Newman, 986 F.2d 159; Adams
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circuit courts, a state constitutional framework that had gone
unchallenged since 1897 would seem an unlikely candidate. But the
Third Circuit was undeterred.
In 1897, Delaware adopted a method of judicial selection that
limited control of the bench by a single party, in a novel attempt to
prevent judges from “being under political obligations.”51 The
provision was amended in 1951 to exclude third parties and balance
the judiciary between Democrats and Republicans.52 When it came
before the Third Circuit, Article IV Section 3 of the Delaware
Constitution read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall at all times be
subject to all of the following limitations:
First, three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in office at the same
time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall be
of the other major political party.
Second, at any time when the total number of Judges of the Superior Court
shall be an even number not more than one-half of the members of all such
offices shall be of the same political party; and at any time when the
number of such offices shall be an odd number, then not more than a bare
majority of the members of all such offices shall be of the same major
political party, the remaining members of such offices shall be of the other
major political party.53

And the chorus continued for six stanzas to encompass other state
courts, with all seats requiring consent of a Senate majority.54 This
political balancing requirement escaped scrutiny for well over a
century, but it was not the balancing that motivated the eventual court
challenge; rather, it was the two-party monopoly on the judiciary.
Plaintiff James Adams registered as a political independent, but
found that his unwillingness to fall in line with the two-party fiat left
him unable to apply for a vacant seat on the bench.55 He challenged
the constitutionality of the political balancing requirement, leading the
Third Circuit to strike down this staple of the Delaware governmental
system.56 The court framed the purpose of the policymaking exception
as ensuring that new administrations could implement their policies

v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019).
51. Adams, 922 F.3d at 169 (citing J.A. 117-18).
52. Id. at 170.
53. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
54. Id.
55. Adams, 922 F.3d at 172.
56. Id. at 172-73.
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without obstruction from politically disloyal employees.57 Having
framed the issue this way, the court applied the policymaking
exception a bit differently than the other circuits, holding that “the
question before us is not whether judges make policy, it is whether
they make policies that necessarily reflect the political will and
partisan goals of the party in power.”58 After citing various rules
governing judicial conduct, the court concluded that judges should be
independent, not politically loyal, and held that judges are not
policymakers who should be “tied to the will of the Governor and his
political preferences.”59 The court recognized the important role that
a judge plays, but did not consider political affiliation to be an
appropriate requirement for the judiciary, referring to the language of
Branti.60
The court also considered a second justification for the political
balancing requirement, rejecting the government’s argument that this
provision was narrowly tailored to further a different government
interest—political balance.61 The court held that the provision was not
narrowly tailored since it excluded third parties and independents.62
While it did not decide whether political balance in the judiciary was
a vital government interest, leaving that issue open for a future case, it
did express concern about “conflating party balance with judicial
impartiality.”63
IV. DISCUSSION

This section outlines the proper understanding of the Elrod-Branti
exception, and then discusses how some courts have erred in applying
this exception by losing the meaning and purpose of “policymaker” as
developed by the Supreme Court. While the policymaking exception
does permit patronage practices for some positions, this exception,
properly understood, does not merely ask whether one makes policy,
but instead requires that the position implement the political objectives
and policies of the controlling party.
57. Id. at 178.
58. Id. at 179.
59. Id. at 179-80.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Adams, 922 F.3d at 181-82. The court tested this alternative government interest in political
balance under the narrowly tailored requirement, which it extracted from Rutan. Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74 (patronage practices must be “narrowly tailored to further vital government
interests”).
62. Id. at 182.
63. Id. at 183 (citing Common Cause Ind. v. Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm'n,
800 F.3d 913, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2015)).
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A. Understanding and Applying the Policymaking Exception

The present circuit split did not arise due to differing views of the
judicial role. None of the circuits have validated patronage practices
because they believed judges should be political, or that they should
decide cases according to the executive’s will. In fact, the Sixth
Circuit expressly admonished this practice as unwise.64 Whatever
differences may exist in the courts’ views of the judicial function, they
are not responsible for the conflicting outcomes. This split is directly,
if not solely, attributable to the courts’ understanding and framing of
the Elrod-Branti policymaking exception.
Adams framed the test as being whether judges “make policies that
necessarily reflect the political will and partisan goals of the party in
power.”65 In stark contrast, Kurowski held that the exception does not
“turn on the relation between the job in question and the
implementation of the appointing officer’s policies.”66 To determine
whether the exception does in fact turn on the position’s
implementation of policy, one must revisit the language of Elrod and
Branti.
Elrod created the policymaking exception to narrowly permit
political patronage practices for only certain positions, what the Court
deemed “policymaking” positions, recognizing a government interest
in politically loyal employees so that “representative government not
be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of
the new administration.”67 This language quite clearly rebukes
Kurowski’s test, where the court did not believe Elrod made anything
turn on the implementation of the appointing officer’s policies.68
Branti’s critical reformulation of the exception makes clear that the
inquiry is not whether the “policymaker” label fit the position, but
“whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved.”69 While this brings the inquiry into focus by shifting
attention away from the “policymaking” label, it does not alter the
underlying government interest that the exception was created to serve.
After all, if courts are not focused on whether the position implements
a party's policies, then what does “effective performance” mean?
Republicans and Democrats are not automatically more effective at
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1993).
Adams, 922 F.3d at 179.
Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
Kurowski,848 F.2d at 770.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
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certain jobs. Political affiliation makes them more effective only
insofar as they aid in the implementation of the controlling party's
policies.
The proper inquiry under the Elrod-Branti exception is whether
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved. And it will be an
appropriate requirement when the office involves implementing the
partisan policies of the controlling party, and when political loyalty is
necessary to ensure those policies are properly implemented.
Formulated this way, the test applies Branti’s language through the
lens of Elrod and the underlying government interest it recognized.
This test is essentially the same as what the Third Circuit applied in
Adams,70 and the First and Fourth Circuits have placed the underlying
government interest at the forefront of their policymaking exception
analysis in recent decisions.71
Applying the above inquiry to judges, political affiliation is a
manifestly inappropriate requirement for the office.
Proper
application of the law requires independence, not political loyalty. The
policymaking exception was created so that an administration could
prevent obstruction of its policies, but courts are often asked to be
obstructionists. Judges must be willing to invalidate policies that run
afoul of the Constitution, and cannot be required to step aside and
merely function as a tool of the executive. Judicial appointments are
a check on the judiciary, but are emphatically not a method of
implementing the executive’s policy. If this is not so, then there are
only two branches of government. The importance of an independent
judiciary is self-evident, but is also enshrined in state and national rules
of judicial conduct.72 Kurowski and Newman did not err because they
disagreed about the need for an independent judiciary; rather, they
misunderstood the fundamental inquiry commanded by Branti and
Elrod. These defects are worth exploring further.

70. The Third Circuit’s test was whether judges “make policies that necessarily reflect the political
will and partisan goals of the party in power.” Adams, 922 F.3d at 179.
71. McCaffrey v. Chapman, 921 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that a sheriff’s deputy fell
within the exception since “[r]equiring a sheriff to employ deputies who have displayed the level of
hostility portrayed in this complaint could reasonably impede a sheriff’s obligation to his electorate to
implement the platform on which he campaigned”); Eves v. LePage, 927 F.3d 575, 584 (1st Cir. 2019)
(the court’s analysis mixed in some general policymaking considerations but ultimately cited Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976), in holding that the employee was “'in a position to thwart' the policy
objectives of 'the in-party'").
72. Adams, 922 F.3d at 179 (noting that the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct both require judges to be independent and “unswayed
by partisan interests”).
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B. Elrod’s Evanescence

The essential shortcoming of Kurowski and Newman is that they
failed to recognize and apply the government interest underlying the
policymaking exception, which is preventing obstruction. When this
interest is not furthered by a political patronage requirement, these
hiring (and firing) practices violate the First Amendment. Rather than
looking to this government interest, courts have often considered
factors that primarily answer whether the position can be considered a
“policymaking” position. The policymaking label should have died
after the Branti reformulation, when the Court expressly abandoned
it.73 However, since the exception has become known as the
“policymaking exception,” it should not be surprising that courts have
had trouble disentangling this consideration from their analysis.
Kurowski considered factors such as whether the office involves
making “the sort of decisions about which there are political debates,”
while Newman held that “judges are policymakers because their
political beliefs influence and dictate their decisions on important
jurisprudential matters.”74 These political considerations indicate that
the courts were influenced by the policymaking label, attempting to
ascertain the degree to which judges may make policy that is
influenced by their political beliefs. But even if judges make policy,
and even if their views are influenced by their “ideals, life experiences,
and political philosophies,” 75 this is not the type of policymaking that
requires political alignment with the governor. This sort of analysis is
why the Branti court provided the football coach example; even if
football coaches make a certain form of policy, political affiliation is
clearly not an appropriate requirement and would not lend itself to
more effective performance “no matter which party is in control.”76
The Ninth Circuit has developed a nine-factor test that seeks to aid
courts in determining whether an employee is a policymaker, which is
of course the wrong inquiry. The test considers:
[1] whether [the employee had] vague or broad responsibilities, in addition
to [the employee’s][2] relative pay, [3] technical competence, [4] power to
control others, [5] authority to speak in the name of policymakers, [6]
public perception, [7] influence on programs, [8] contact with elected

73. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
74. Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1988); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d
159, 163 (6th Cir. 1993).
75. Newman, 986 F.2d at 165 (Jones, J., concurring).
76. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
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officials, and [9] responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders.77

These factors attempt to determine whether a position is
policymaking in nature. But that label, once again, is meaningless
when divorced from the government interest of implementing the
administration’s policies. While powerful employees with more broad
responsibilities may often be in a position to undercut an
administration’s policies, these factors are relevant only when
considered in light of that government interest—preventing
obstruction. This nine-factor inquiry would bury the most important
considerations, like placing “responsiveness to partisan politics and
political leaders,” below “technical competence” and “relative pay.”78
And certainly relative pay bears not even a tenuous connection to the
ability to undercut an administration’s policies.
This factored approach, less explicit yet still lurking in Kurowski
and Newman, demonstrates how courts have lost the meaning of Elrod
in applying its exception. In preserving analyses that attempt to decide
whether a position is policymaking in nature, the courts have kept
Elrod’s body, but its soul has evanesced. The Court used the
“policymaking” label only in a well-intentioned effort to narrowly
define those positions that could obstruct an administration’s policies.
But even after Branti abandoned this empty label, courts have lost
sight of the government interest that first created the exception,
chasing Elrod’s form, but not its meaning.
C. Compounding the Confusion

While losing sight of the government interest is the primary defect
in Kurowski and Newman, they have several other flaws that help
explain their incorrect holdings. In Kurowski, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that if the exception turned on the position’s
implementation of the controlling party’s policy, then “the governor
could not consider a would-be judge’s politics when deciding who to
appoint,” and believed this to be an unthinkable result.79 The court
apparently presumed the validity of partisan judicial appointments due
to the longstanding practice that Justice Scalia noted in his Rutan
dissent.80 Kurowski was decided pre-Rutan. But now that these
77. Carroll v. City of Phx., No. CV 07-00148 PHXNVW, 2007 WL 1140400, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr.
17, 2007) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1132 (9th Cir.2001)).
78. Id.
79. Kurowski, 848 F.2d at 770.
80. Justice Scalia appeared to believe that the policymaking exception would prevent partisan
appointment of judges, but recognized that this had always been the practice and would not have been
willing to invalidate it. “[I]f there is any category of jobs for whose performance party affiliation is not an
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appointment practices are within the scope of this exception, perhaps
the Seventh Circuit would not have presumed their validity.
The Seventh Circuit also erred in its belief that state judicial
elections imply a political component to the office. But these
structures establish a democratic component, not a political
component. In confronting the interest of a state in regulating judicial
elections, the Court has insisted that judges remain independent from
outside interests, “with nothing to influence or controul him but God
and his conscience.”81 And the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the
governor may consider political affiliation “when making an
appointment, just as the voters may consider these factors,” highlights
one of the flaws that the Adams court singled out—conflating the
ability to consider political affiliation with ability to condition
employment on a particular affiliation.82
While there can be no doubt, as the Seventh Circuit believed, that a
governor may consider the political views of a judge, this is not the
same as conditioning employment on party affiliation, which violates
a candidate’s First Amendment rights. As the Adams court held,
“[t]here is a wide gulf between a governor asking a judicial candidate
about his philosophy on sentencing, for example, and a governor
posting a sign that says ‘Communists need not apply.’”83 This
distinction is sensible given that Branti asks whether political
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the office.84 And it was
this distinction that ultimately led Judge Jones astray in his Newman
concurrence, where he agreed to uphold the patronage practice despite
stating that “it cannot be seriously contended that being a member of
a certain party . . . should be a requirement for the effective
performance of being a judge.”85 These additional errors further
appropriate requirement, it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship is not only unneeded but
positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that a federal administration of one party will appoint a judge
from another party. And it has always been rare.” Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 92–93,
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
Justice Scalia eloquently offered the same critique in a later decision that extended the scope of this
exception to government contracts. “What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers
when they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to discern that a practice which the text of the
Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people have regarded as constitutional for 200
years, is in fact unconstitutional?” Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
688–89 (1996) (emphasis in original).
81. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015) (citing Address of John Marshall, in
Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–1830, p. 616 (1830)) (internal
quotations omitted).
82. Kurowski, 848 F.2d at 770; Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 181 (3d Cir. 2019).
83. Adams, 922 F.3d at 181.
84. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
85. Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring) (citing
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 91 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added and
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explain how the earlier circuit court decisions went astray in holding
that judges fell within the policymaking exception.
V. JUDICIAL REFORM AND FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS

Since the proper interpretation of the Elrod-Branti exception
excludes judges, their appointments cannot be conditioned on political
affiliation. The First Amendment right preserved by this line of cases
could invalidate potential judicial reform efforts and existing
appointment practices. This section discusses these complications by
considering an alternate justification for political requirements, and the
potential applicability of the political question doctrine to bar
challenges to federal appointment practices.
A. Political Balancing

The threat of judicial reform is particularly acute as the country
responds to a presidency that has questioned the norms and institutions
of its government.86 The very manner of Donald Trump’s victory in
the 2016 Presidential Election, a result of electoral configuration and
not the electorate’s will, has itself invited questions about our
institutions, and perhaps provided a willingness to question the present
wisdom of decisions made two centuries ago.87 Combine these
evolving attitudes with the recent political battles over Supreme Court
vacancies, including the bare 50-vote confirmation of Justice Brett
Kavanaugh in 2018,88 and the result could very well be, to loosely
paraphrase Justice Scalia, a court-reforming cocktail.89
An essential ingredient of this cocktail, the sine qua non of any
reform movement, is political impetus.90 The Court has always
omitted).
86. President Trump’s attacks on government institutions are numerous and wide-ranging, often
targeting his own appointees and the departments they head. See Peter Nicholas, Trump Blasts Sessions’s
Leadership of Justice Department, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumpresumes-attacks-on-sessions-1535209768 [https://perma.cc/39DK-BJLU]; In His Own Words: The
President's Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CENTER (June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts [https://perma.cc/DL54-2AH4].
87. Erin Corbett, Why Democrats Want to Abolish the Electoral College—and Republicans Want
to Keep It, FORTUNE (April 2, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/04/02/abolish-the-electoral-college-votes/
[https://perma.cc/688X-4P8P] (discussing growing support to abolish the Electoral College).
88. Dan Berman, How Senators Voted on Brett Kavanaugh, CNN (Oct. 6, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/how-senators-voted-on-brett-kavanaugh/index.html
[https://perma.cc/FSP2-8V8V].
89. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 413 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (skewering the
majority opinion’s analysis as “a freedom-destroying cocktail”).
90. “An indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily
depends.” Sine Qua Non, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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decided immensely important issues, but the country has now looked
to this branch to recognize and protect new individual rights under its
substantive due process doctrine, and to remove those issues from the
typical legislative process.91 If this evolving concept of the modern
Court’s role has in fact provided the political motivation for judicial
reform, it would certainly explain why some wish to go beyond term
limits—a reform that would seem to address institutional concerns
without imposing partisan requirements. Yet despite being, by some
measures, a more “moderate” approach to judicial reform, term limits
would require a constitutional amendment.92 A political balancing
requirement had been suggested by former Presidential candidate Pete
Buttigieg as a bold reform that could be accomplished legislatively.93
But Elrod commands that partisan requirements cannot be imposed on
judicial seats without changing the Constitution.
The government could attempt to assert a different government
interest to uphold the political balancing requirement and restrict First
Amendment rights, as the Delaware government did in Adams. The
argument would be that the requirement is narrowly tailored to serve a
vital government interest in a politically balanced judiciary. The Third
Circuit rejected this argument on the narrowly tailored prong, since the
provision excluded third parties, but also expressed skepticism about
the government interest, believing that party balance should not be
conflated with judicial impartiality.94 Regardless of this interest’s
precise framing, it seems unlikely that courts would accept political
requirements for the bench since it actually entrenches political
considerations in the judiciary, even if its intention is to make the
branch less political, or to make it appear less political. The Seventh
Circuit has already rejected this political balancing argument in the
91. Abortion rights, for example, have become a litmus test for any Supreme Court nominee.
Justice Kavanaugh’s views on Roe v. Wade, while perhaps a secondary issue during his confirmation,
were probed by the Ranking Democratic Member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Dianne Feinstein,
and moderate Republicans such as Senators Lisa Murkowski and Susan Collins. Jordain Carney,
Kavanaugh: Roe v. Wade Has Been 'Reaffirmed Many Times', THE HILL (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/405135-kavanaugh-roe-v-wade-has-been-reaffirmed-many-times
[https://perma.cc/6CVH-3F6N].
92. Term limits would conflict with U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, which provides that federal judges
hold their offices “during good Behaviour.”
93. October Democratic Debate Transcript: 4th Debate in Ohio, REV (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.rev.com/blog/october-democratic-debate-transcript-4th-debate-from-ohio
[https://perma.cc/GE4H-NJDK] (where Pete Buttigieg indicated that his political balancing proposal may
be possible without a constitutional amendment).
A proposal that involves appointment outside the normal structure of appointment by the president
and consent of the Senate, as Buttigieg has suggested, would almost certainly require a constitutional
amendment. But even after excising this portion of the proposal, the political balancing requirement is
separately unconstitutional under Elrod, as held by Adams.
94. Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 183 (3d Cir. 2019).
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judicial context.95
These persistent rebuffs may cause some to become frustrated with
the seemingly impervious judicial shield, and the Court has indeed
been mindful to safeguard its public reputation as a non-partisan
institution.96 It is impossible, or at least impossibly naïve, to believe
that judges are completely insulated from political considerations,
whether those influences are conscious or not. But it is one thing to
acknowledge this reality, and to hopefully minimize its impact, and
another thing entirely to embrace partisan politics as legal orthodoxy
and enshrine it as a pillar of our judicial system.
B. Federal Judicial Appointments

The prior cases involving judicial appointments have concerned
state judges, but similar to our federal system, Delaware’s
constitutional framework required consent of a Senate majority for
most of the governor’s judicial appointments.97 Would the Elrod line
of cases prevent the president from conditioning federal judicial
appointments on political affiliation? Given the similarities between
the Delaware and federal structures of advice and consent, there cannot
be a principled basis for distinguishing between the two systems.
However, since the Constitution empowers the president to nominate
judges, a court challenge could well be nonjusticiable.98 Some have
argued that intervention in the federal appointment of a judge would
undoubtedly be a political question.99 But, as with virtually all cases
concerning the political question doctrine, some doubt may be wise.
“A controversy is nonjusticiable—i.e., involves a political
question—where there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.’”100 The
Constitution commits the power to appoint federal judges to the
president, with advice and consent of the Senate.101 But a hypothetical
challenge to a federal judicial appointment would not question the

95. Common Cause Ind. v. Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm'n, 800 F.3d 913, 928
(7th Cir. 2015).
96. Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama
Judge’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chiefjustice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/H7JU-P5Z3].
97. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
98. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
99. Michael E. Solimine, Constitutional Restrictions on the Partisan Appointment of Federal and
State Judges, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 955, 968 (1993).
100. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)).
101. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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wisdom or propriety of the president’s considerations in exercising this
power; rather, it would be a case about the plaintiff’s First Amendment
right to freedom of association.102 The plaintiff would not be
challenging the scope of the president’s power to nominate, she would
be asserting that her First Amendment rights were infringed by the
nomination process. The political question is incidental to the
individual right asserted, possibly providing reason for courts to hear
such a challenge.103
Even though this is largely an academic discussion, since the
president could easily circumvent this restriction by putting a token
candidate on some sort of short list, and it is unlikely for any such case
to arise absent an explicit partisan condition (like Delaware’s
constitutional provision), there could be practical implications. If the
Court were to enjoin the nomination proceedings, it could delay the
nomination of a Supreme Court Justice. If the process were to then
bleed into an election year, the minority party could claim the “Merrick
Garland concern,” perhaps with even more force, potentially allowing
the opposing party to delay the filling of a seat until the next
presidential election has been decided.104 This sort of political mud
fight may be precisely the circumstance in which the Court would be
eager to declare an issue nonjusticiable, but such an outcome should
perhaps not be presumed.
VI. CONCLUSION

If the judiciary’s duty is to “say what the law is,” then it cannot be
a mouthpiece for the executive, and its members cannot be blunt
political instruments.105 The Constitution indeed prohibits partisan
102. Such a case would be unlike Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004),
where the court declined to hear one of the challenges made to President Bush’s recess
appointment of Judge Pryor. The court held the claim that the President “circumvented and
showed an improper lack of deference to the Senate's advice-and-consent role” to be a political
question that involved subjective consideration of political wisdom. Id. at 1227.
103. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale
L.J. 517, 584 (1966) (suggesting that courts are hesitant to apply the political question doctrine when
individual rights are at stake).
Justice Marshall originally distinguished individual rights as being outside the realm of a political
question. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).
104. The Senate declined to consider President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Merrick Garland,
in 2016, arguing that they should not fill the seat during an election year. Ron Elving, What Happened
With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-itmatters-now [https://perma.cc/7VA3-38VU].
105. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177,(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is”).
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conditions on judicial appointments. However noble the concept of an
apolitical Court may be, it cannot be achieved by attaching political
conditions to seats on the bench. The Third Circuit’s ruling in Adams
was correct—judges do not fall within a proper understanding of the
policymaking exception, and this decision ought to instruct any court
that confronts legislative attempts to affix partisan locks on chamber
doors. This could frustrate judicial reform efforts. But when seeking
to change a branch of government, obstacles should be expected.
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